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I. INTRODUCTION
When introducing Neil Barofsky during the nomination
hearing for his appointment as Special Inspector General for the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIG TARP) in November 2008,
Senator Charles Schumer offered, "If he can take on the
[Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia], I am sure he can
handle a few Wall Street bankers . . . ."' Senator Schumer was
referring to Barofsky's role in investigating and prosecuting the
Colombian narco-terrorist organization that controlled one-half of
the world's cocaine production while the nominee served as
Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York.2
Barofsky was confirmed as SIG TARP on December 8, 2008.' In
his first two years as chief TARP overseer, Barofsky might equate
dealing with the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) in
pursuit of transparent TARP oversight to navigating the jungles
outside Bogota. 2010 marked a tense year between SIG TARP
and Treasury, with disagreements involving three areas of the
TARP: the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP); the
1. The Nomination of Neil M. Barofsky, of New York, to be the Special Inspector
General, Troubled Asset Relief Program: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 3 (2008), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg504l9/pdf/CHRG-110shrg5O419.pdf
(statement of Sen. Charles Schumer, Member, Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs).
2. Id.
3. Paul C. Light, Senate Confirms N.Y Prosecutor as Inspector General for
Bailout, WASH. POST, Dec. 9,2008, at A17, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/12/08/AR2008120803538.html.
4. See SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM,
QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONG. 9 (Oct. 26, 2010), available at
http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2010/October20l0_QuarterlyReport-toCo
ngress.pdf [hereinafter SIG TARP QUARTERLY REPORT, Oct. 2010] ("Treasury's
unfortunate insensitivity to the values of transparency has led it to engage in conduct
that risks further damaging public trust in Government.").
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Treasury auto plan for General Motors Company (GM); and
finally, Treasury's loss estimate for the government's stake in
American International Group, Inc. (AIG).5
Between December 2008 and November 2010, SIG TARP
grew in size from 2 to 140 full-time employees. Part II will chart
this development.! Through much of 2009, the growing SIG
TARP office was in dispute with Treasury concerning SIG
8TARP's legal status and respective authority. Part III concerns
this conflict.9 In 2010, an emboldened SIG TARP office issued
pointed criticism of Treasury's TARP programming under
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner.o Part IV will examine
three areas of the TARP in which SIG TARP and Treasury
Department have clashed, namely: the HAMP; GM programming;
and the AIG loss estimate."
In its first two years in operation, SIG TARP has asserted
itself through rigorous oversight, seeking transparency in the
5. See infra Part IV.
6. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act: One Year Later: Hearing before
the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 42 (2009),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-11 1shrg56019/pdf/CHRG-
111shrg56019.pdf [hereinafter EESA: One Year Later] (statement of Neil Barofsky,
Special Inspector Gen. for the Troubled Asset Relief Program: "When I started on
December 15 [2008], it was just me and my deputy. . ."); Robert Schmidt, Neil
Barofsky: The Bailout Cop the White House Loathes, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 11, 2010,
5:00 PM), [hereinafter Schmidt, Neil Barofsky]
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_47/b4204042291239.htm (noting
that SIG TARP employs 140, as of this date).
7. See infra Part II.
8. See Evan Perez & Deborah Solomon, Treasury Retreats From Standoff With
TARP Watchdog, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2009, at A3, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125193355469281319.html.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM, SIGTARP-10-005, FACTORS AFFECTING IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM 31-33 (Mar. 25, 2010), available
at
http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/audit/2010/FactorsAffectingImplementation of-the
HomeAffordableModificationProgram.pdf [hereinafter SIG TARP HAMP
AUDIT REPORT] (criticizing Treasury's implementation of the HAMP); Robert
Schmidt, U.S. Treasury's Bailout Cop Trains Fire on the White House, BLOOMBERG
(Nov. 11, 2010, 11:06 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-11/u-s-treasury-
s-bailout-cop-trains-fire-on-the-white-house.html [hereinafter Schmidt, Bailout Cop
Trains Fire] (criticizing Treasury for alleged manipulation of TARP loss figures).
11. See infra Part IV.
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largest emergency expenditure by the government in U.S. history.12
Some argue that Barofsky's office merely second-guesses the
inherently complex, yet commonly successful, TARP measures
adopted by Treasury.13 Ultimately, this Note concludes that SIG
TARP has served well in its first two years; that arguably over-
aggressive oversight is better than the alternative.14
II. THE SIG TARP OFFICE Is ESTABLISHED AND TAKES FORM
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
(EESA) 5 was signed into law by President George W. Bush on
October 3, 2008 in response to a financial system on the brink of
collapse. Failures of risk management within the financial
services industry, together with government regulatory failures, led
to a severe credit crisis upon the decline of the U.S. housing
market." A total of $700 billion in TARP funds were authorized
12. Russell Goldman, Financial Bailout Balloons to the Trillions, ABC NEWS
(Nov. 25, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/Economy/story?id=6332892 ("The
government's financial bailout will be the most expensive single expenditure in
American history. . . .").
13. See, e.g., Jen Psaki, White House Deputy Communications Director, The
Facts on AIG, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Oct. 27, 2010, 6:00 AM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/10/27/facts-aig (defending Treasury's TARP
reporting policies, saying of Barofsky, "Some people just don't like movies with
happy endings"); Editorial, Treasury's Back-Seat Driver: The Auto Dealers Find
Another Friend, WASH. POST, July 20, 2010, at A20 [hereinafter Treasury's Back-Seat
Driver] (arguing that the July 2010 audit report criticizing Treasury's auto program
was not constructive).
14. See infra Parts IV-V.
15. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122
Stat. 3765 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201-5261).
16. Greg Hitt & Deborah Solomon, Historic Bailout Passes as Economy Slips
Further, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2008, at Al, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122304922742602533.html.
17. Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Risky Business: The Credit Crisis and Failure (Part
I), 104 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 398, 403-404 (2010) (describing failures in industry
and regulatory risk management). The underlying causes and nature of the economic
crisis cannot be covered here in detail, though they have been studied extensively by
others. See generally Brian J. M. Quinn, The Failure of Private Ordering and the
Financial Crisis of 2008, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 549 (2009) (detailing the many causes
of the 2008 crisis which included: decreased regulation, increased credit, complex
financial instruments, and the failure of the housing markets that collateralized
mortgage-backed securities); Evan N. Turgeon, Boom and Bust for Whom?: The
Economic Philosophy Behind the 2008 Financial Crisis, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 139
(2009) (assessing the causes of the 2008 crisis, and critiquing the government's past
and current regulatory policy); Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating
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by EESA; $350 billion available immediately, and a second $350
billion installment requiring Senate approval.8  This approval was
granted on January 15, 2009."
EESA also established the SIG TARP office.20 The
legislation mandated audits of Treasury TARP programming, in
which SIG TARP must list and estimate the total amount of
21troubled assets purchased by the Treasury Department. In
addition, SIG TARP audits must summarize Treasury's purpose in
taking on such assets.22 Under EESA, SIG TARP must report
quarterly on its activities." SIG TARP also investigates cases of
private sector TARP fraud, but these matters are outside of the
scope of this Note.24
EESA does not identify the department in which SIG
TARP exists; rather, this is implied from the Inspector General
Act of 1978 (IG Act)." Under the IG Act, as the TARP is a
Treasury program, it follows that SIG TARP technically exists
within the Department of Treasury.26 Under EESA, funding for
the SIG TARP office is independent of the Treasury Department;
Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. REv. 183, 186 (2009) ("[M]arket incentives
converged to increase systemic risk to the point of collapse.").
18. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 115, 12 U.S.C.A. § 5225
(West 2008).
19. Deborah Solomon & Greg Hitt, TARP Funds' Second Half Set for Release as
Senate Signs Off on Request, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2009, at A3, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123205759811587287.html.
20. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 121, 12 U.S.C.A. § 5231
(West 2008).
21. Id. at § 121(c).
22. Id.
23. Id. at §121(f).
24. Allegations of TARP fraud which SIG TARP has helped prosecute include:
U.S. v. Lee Bentley Farkas, No. 1:10-cr-00200 (E.D. Va. filed June 15, 2010)
(indicting on one count of conspiracy and fifteen counts of fraud concerning the
alleged misappropriation of over 1 billion dollars); U.S. v. Jeffrey L. Levine, No. 1:09-
cr-554 (N.D. Ga. filed Dec. 22, 2009) (indicting, similarly, for TARP fraud); U.S. v.
Charles J. Antonucci Jr., No. 1:10-mj-00507 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 13, 2010) (filing suit
on ten counts, including bribery and fraud).
25. Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. 3 (2006).
26. See Inspector General Act of 1978 § 6(c). Barofsky offered his own
interpretation of SIG TARP's legal standing, describing SIG TARP as "a strictly
independent agency within Treasury." Following the Money: Report of the Special
Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP): Hearing before
the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 111th Cong. 39 (2009) [hereinafter
Following the Money (H. Oversight Comm.)] (statement of Neil Barofsky, Special
Inspector Gen. for the Troubled Asset Relief Program).
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$50,000,000 was initially authorized for the SIG TARP to carry out
its duties.27 Finally, the SIG TARP office will be terminated when
the Treasury Department is no longer responsible for any troubled
assets. As the TARP has evolved from a bank investment
program into a more complex program29 reaching additional areas
such as the Auto Industry and mortgage modification, 30 the
winding-down of SIG TARP under EESA is not imminent."
The SIG TARP was not the only oversight office
established under EESA. The Congressional Oversight Panel
(COP) also has its genesis in the October 2008 Act.32  The five
panelists, appointed by legislative leaders, have held positions in
various areas of politics, academia, law, and finance.33 Every
month, the COP must issue a report;3 each report has centered on
one aspect of the government's financial recovery efforts.35
Though the offices oversee similar areas, the COP differs from
SIG TARP in a some important ways.36 COP has neither the
27. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 121(g), 12 U.S.C.A.
§5231() (West 2009).
28. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 121(h) (stating that SIG
TARP will terminate on the later of two dates: 1.) the date that the last troubled asset
has been sold or transferred out of the control of the Federal Government; 2.) the
date of expiration of the last insurance contract issued by EESA).
29. See Dawn Kopecki & Catherine Dodge, US. Rescue may Reach $23.7
Trillion, Barofsky Says, BLOOMBERG (July 20, 2009, 3:01 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.comlapps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aYOtX8UyslaM.
30. See infra Part IV.
31. See Schmidt, Neil Barofsky, supra note 6 (describing how after Treasury's
declaration of the end of the TARP in October 2010, Barofsky says that he intends to
keep SIG TARP operating for another 8-10 years because, while new disbursements
are finished, established TARP programs move forward).
32. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 §125.
33. The panel is currently composed of Ted Kaufman (COP Chairman, U.S.
Senator from Delaware), Richard Neiman (New York Superintendent of Banks),
Damon Silvers (Director of Policy and Special Counsel, AFL-CIO), J. Mark
McWatters (Attorney), and Kenneth Troske (Professor of Economics, University of
Kentucky). The former COP Chair was Elizabeth Warren (Professor of Law,
Harvard University). CONGR. OVERSIGHT PANEL, DEC. OVERSIGHT REPORT: A
REVIEW OF TREASURY'S FORECLOSURE PREVENTION PROGRAMS 168 (Dec. 14, 2010),
available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-121410-report.pdf [hereinafter COP
DEC. 2010 REPORT].
34. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 125(b)(1), 12 U.S.C.A. §
5233(b)(1) (West 2009).
35. See, e.g., COP DEC. 2010 REPORT, supra note 33 (providing an update and
analysis of one particular TARP program, the HAMP).
36. Compare Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 121, with
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 125.
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
auditing mandate nor the private-sector investigatory purpose of
the SIG TARP. Also, with around 140 employees, the SIG
38TARP office is significantly larger in size.
Almost all of the TARP's first $350 billion had been
committed to use39 by the time Barofsky took control of SIG
TARP on December 15, 2008." By April of 2009, nearly $600
billion had been allocated.41 Amidst an urgent need to begin its
oversight activities, an early challenge the newly established office
faced was personnel.4 2 SIG TARP needed a sizeable staff of
experienced auditors and investigators, and it needed them
quickly.43 On April 24, 2009, the Special Inspector General for the
Troubled Asset Relief Program Act of 2009 (SIG TARP Act of
2009)" became law; it would allow SIG TARP certain extended
hiring flexibilities. 45  For example, as SIG TARP lacked the
capacity to train new federal employees, the SIG TARP Act
allowed Barofsky to rehire experienced annuitants - retired
auditors and investigators who were drawing a pension - with a
waiver such that they would not need to give up that pension." On
the day that President Barack Obama signed the SIG TARP Act
37. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 125.
38. See Schmidt, Neil Barofsky, supra note 6 (noting SIG TARP's approximate
number of employees).
39. See Kevin Drawbaugh, Democrats Prepare Hurdle for 2nd TARP $350 Bin,
REUTERS (Dec. 15,2008, 6:26 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE4BE6AE20081215 (noting that in mid-
December 2008 only $15 billion of the originally authorized sum remained
undistributed).
40. EESA: One Year Later, supra note 6, at 42 (statement of Neil Barofsky,
Special Inspector Gen. for the Troubled Asset Relief Program).
41. Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Money for Nothing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2009, at
A23, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/27/opinion/27krugman.html.
42. A Review of TARP Oversight, Accountability, and Transparency for U.S.
Taxpayers: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H.
Fin. Services Comm., 111th Cong. 6 (2009), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg48676/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg48676.pdf
[hereinafter A Review of TARP Oversight] (statement of Neil Barofsky, Special
Inspector Gen. for the Troubled Asset Relief Program).
43. Id.
44. SIG TARP Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-15, secs. 1-7, § 121, 123 Stat. 1603 (to
be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5231).
45. See SIG TARP Act of 2009, sec. 3, § 121(e) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§5231).
46. A Review of TARP Oversight, supra note 42, at 11 (statement of Neil
Barofsky, Special Inspector Gen. for the Troubled Asset Relief Program).
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of 2009, SIG TARP had only thirty-seven employees on staff.47 By
the end of July 2009, a mere three months later, the ranks at SIG
TARP had grown to seventy.4 In April 2010, Barofsky's office
employed 116.49 The 2009 SIG TARP Act was an early sign that
SIG TARP would be the object of Congressional favor;
unsurprising, as the TARP program which it oversees has been
immensely publicly unpopular.o
By the spring of 2010, the well-staffed SIG TARP was
exerting significant influence through published audit reports
citing failures in Treasury's TARP mortgage-relief and auto
programs," along with additional criticism of Treasury's estimates
of TARP losses in the AIG program.5 But before studying areas
of more recent concern, some background into the early auditing
activities of SIG TARP, and the resulting pushback by Secretary
Geithner's Treasury Department, warrants discussion.
47. See Following the Money: A Quarterly Report by the Special Inspector
General for the TARP: Hearing before the J. Econ. Comm., 111th Cong. 17 (2009),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg52273/pdf/CHRG-
111shrg52273.pdf [hereinafter Following the Money (J. Econ. Comm.)] (statement of
Neil Barofsky, Special Inspector Gen. for the Troubled Asset Relief Program).
48. Following the Money (H. Oversight Comm.), supra note 26, at 32 (statement
of Neil Barofsky, Special Inspector Gen. for the Troubled Asset Relief Program).
49. Fin. Services and General Gov't Appropriations for 2011: Hearing before the
H. Comm. on Appropriations, 111th Cong. 205 (2010) (statement of Neil Barofsky,
Special Inspector Gen. for the Troubled Asset Relief Program).
50. See, e.g., Deborah Solomon, Bailout Anger Undermines Geithner, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 22, 2010, at Al, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703798904575069610953163620.html
("[Secretary Geithner's] association with unpopular financial bailouts has become an
albatross.").
51. SIG TARP HAMP AUDIT REPORT, supra note 10; OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, SIGTARP-10-008,
FACTORS AFFECTING THE DECISIONS OF GENERAL MOTORS AND CHRYSLER TO
REDUCE THEIR DEALERSHIP NETWORKS (July 19, 2010), available at
http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/audit/2010/Factors%20Affecting%20the%20Decision
s%20of%2OGeneral%2OMotors%20and%20Chrysler%20to%20Reduce%2OTheir%
20Dealership%20Networks%207_19_2010.pdf [hereinafter SIG TARP AUTO AUDIT
REPORT].
52. SIG TARP QUARTERLY REPORT, OCT. 2010, supra note 4, at 8 ("Treasury [is]
vulnerable to charges that it has manipulated its methodology for calculating losses. .
2011] 319
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III. SIG TARP's FIRST YEAR: BUILDING A REPUTATION FOR
INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT
A. Barofsky Decries Initial Failure of Treasury to Seek
Accountability for TARP Funds
"Treasury could, can and should require the banks to
report on their use of [TARP] funds," Barofsky said before
Congress in March 2009." Banks were given scant guidelines upon
TARP disbursements; only Bank of America and Citigroup were
required by Treasury to report on their use of government funds.54
SIG TARP, immediately, intended to bring more transparency to
the TARP - by March, it had mailed voluntary surveys to all
TARP recipients and had received 100 percent compliance in its
request for information on each institution's use of government
funds." Barofsky told Congress that he initiated his survey
program after Treasury indicated that it would not require the
banks to report on their use of TARP funds.56
SIG TARP argued that, in fairness to taxpayers, reporting
requirements on the use of public funds should be adopted by
Treasury." Specifically, SIG TARP noted that the government
was preparing to inject an additional $30 billion into insurance-
giant AIG."' Considerable controversy had arisen from claims that
AIG used its initial TARP disbursements for executive bonuses in
53. Sen. Max Baucus Holds a Hearing on TARP Oversight, 111th Cong. 23 (2009)




54. See Following the Money (J. Econ. Comm.), supra note 47, at 6 (statement of
Neil Barofsky, Special Inspector Gen. for the Troubled Asset Relief Program).
55. See Troubled Asset Relief Program: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 111th Cong. 9 (2009) [hereinafter
TARP (Ways and Means Comm.)] (statement of Neil Barofsky, Special Inspector
Gen. for the Troubled Asset Relief Program).
56. Following the Money (J. Econ. Comm.), supra note 47, at 6-7 (statement of
Neil Barofsky, Special Inspector Gen. for the Troubled Asset Relief Program).
57. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECrOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONG. 137-138 (Apr. 21, 2009), available at
http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2009/April2009-QuarterlyReport-toCongr
ess.pdf.
58. Id. at 138.
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2008.'9 SIG TARP argued that if AIG was not required to report
on its use of additional funds - as was the case under Treasury
policy - public trust in the government's TARP program would be
further compromised." In its first quarterly report to Congress in
April 2009, along with accompanying Congressional testimony,
SIG TARP sharply criticized Treasury's lack of reporting
requirements for institutions accepting TARP funds.
B. Treasury's Request for OLC Clarification on SIG TARP's
Legal Standing
The 2009 conflict between SIG TARP and Treasury has
been described by some commentators as an effort by Treasury to
rein in the oversight authority of SIG TARP.62 On the eve of an
interview with a member of the Treasury General Counsel's Office
regarding TARP payments to AIG that had arguably been used
for executive compensation, Barofsky received an email from
Bernard Knight, Treasury General Counsel, concerning SIG
TARP's position within the Department of the Treasury. Knight
said that Treasury would seek a legal opinion from the Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC) of the Department of Justice regarding
whether the Secretary of the Treasury had supervisory authority
over SIG TARP." One journalist speculated on the particular
timing of Treasury's request, given the start of SIG TARP's audit
regarding AIG bonus payments and Secretary Geithner's position
in 2008 as Chairman of the New York Federal Reserve, where the
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See id.; TARP (Ways and Means Comm.), supra note 55, at 9 (statement of
Neil Barofsky, Special Inspector Gen. for the Troubled Asset Relief Program).
62. See generally Tom Hamburger, Concern About Timing of Two Events, L.A.
TIMES, June 19, 2009, at A20 ("[The OLC request] leaves open the possibility of
conflict [between Treasury and SIG TARP] in the future as audits of [TARP]
multiply."); Amit R. Paley & Ed O'Keefe, Authority Over Bailout Office is
Questioned, WASH. POST, June 19, 2009, at A21, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/06/18/AR2009061804052.html (including commentary that
the Treasury is aggressively trying to protect its powers).
63. Memorandum from Neil M. Barofsky, Special Inspector Gen. for the
Troubled Asset Relief Program, to Bernard Knight, General Counsel, U.S. Dep't of
the Treasury 1 (Apr. 7, 2009) [hereinafter Barofsky to Knight].
64. Id.
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bonus-money was distributed under his watch. 65  A Treasury
spokesperson described the confluence of events as "entirely a
coincidence,"" and Barofsky later said, "I wouldn't go so far as to
do a causal relationship between the two ... ."
In his response to Knight, Barofsky cited specific legislative
intent from Senator Max Baucus, who designed the SIG TARP
section of EESA.6 Baucus stated while advocating for EESA
before Congress, "I designed the office of this inspector general to
be truly independent."6 9 The framework of the Inspector General
Act of 1978 suggests that SIG TARP is within the Department of
the Treasury, in that Treasury must provide SIG TARP with
space, equipment, services, and a delegation of its subpoena
power. 70  Though technically within the Department of the
Treasury and the Executive Branch, Barofsky stressed,
"independence is the most vital thing for an Inspector General."7 1
Given the nature of SIG TARP audits of Treasury TARP
programs, whether SIG TARP was accountable to Treasury was
an issue with important consequences.7
C. Victory for SIG TARP and Independent Oversight
In September 2009, Treasury withdrew its request for the
OLC opinion, and Barofsky announced that SIG TARP was free
from Treasury supervision.7 ' Treasury declined to explain the
reason for the withdrawal of the request.7 4 Some political
65. Hamburger, supra note 62, at A20.
66. Id.
67. Following the Money (H. Oversight Comm.), supra note 26, at 56 (statement
of Neil Barofsky, Special Inspector Gen. for the Troubled Asset Relief Program).
68. Barofsky to Knight, supra note 63, at 3.
69. Id. (quoting Congr. Record, p. S10218 (Oct. 1, 2008)).
70. Inspector General Act of 1978 § 6(c), 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(c) (2006).
71. Following the Money (H. Oversight Comm.), supra note 26, at 48 (statement
of Neil Barofsky, Special Inspector Gen. for the Troubled Asset Relief Program).
72. See Darrell Issa, Op-Ed., TARP and the Demands of Democracy, THE
AMERICAN SPECrATOR (Sept. 10, 2009, 6:08 AM),
http://spectator.org/archives/2009/09/10/tarp-and-the-demands-of-democr (discussing
the importance of independent oversight of the TARP, although Rep. Issa's
additional political comments are extraneous for the purposes of this Note).
73. Perez & Solomon, supra note 8, at A3.
74. Id.
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pressures may have played a role." Senator Charles E. Grassley
had requested from Secretary Geithner an explanation of the OLC
request.76
One month later, Barofsky demonstrated his independence
from Treasury supervision with scathing remarks before Congress
concerning Secretary Geithner's performance when he served as
Chairman of the New York Fed.77 Regarding the much-maligned
executive compensation AIG paid with funds administered
through the Federal Reserve, Barofsky testified that Geithner
failed to know of these payments when it was his job to know.8 Of
Geithner and the AIG compensation-payment ordeal, Barofsky
stated, "he is ultimately responsible."7  This sentiment was
supported in SIG TARP's published audit report on the matter.80
This very audit process had prompted Treasury's request for the
OLC opinion in April 2009." It was not the last criticism offered
by SIG TARP of a Geithner-led office - future statements would
75. See Jim Kuhnhenn, Treasury Backs Down in Clash with Bailout Watchdog,
AP FIN. WIRE (Sept. 3, 2009, 5:48 PM), available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/09/03/treasury-backs-down-in-cl-n276779.html.
76. Letter from Sen. Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Member, U.S. Senate Comm.
on Finance, to Timothy F. Geithner, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Treasury (June 17, 2009).
77. See Mark Trumbull, Obama "Pay Czar" Lacks Clout to Stop $198 Million in
AIG Bonuses, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Oct. 15, 2009),
http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/2009/1014/obama-pay-czar-lacks-clout-to-stop-
198-million-in-aig-bonuses (covering Barofsky's testimony before Congress on the
subject of the AIG payments and Mr. Geithner's role).
78. AIG Bonuses: Audit Report of the SIGTARP: Hearing before the H. Comm.
on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 111th Cong. 93 (2009), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-lllhhrg55101/pdf/CHRG-lllhhrg55101.pdf
(statement of Neil Barofsky, Special Inspector Gen. for the Troubled Asset Relief
Program).
79. Id. at 78 (statement of Neil Barofsky, Special Inspector Gen. for the Troubled
Asset Relief Program).
80. See OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM, SIGTARP-10-002, EXTENT OF FEDERAL AGENCIES' OVERSIGHT




(describing failures of communication within the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
regarding AIG bonus payments).
81. See Hamburger, supra note 62, at A20; Barofsky to Knight, supra note 63, at
3.
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concern Secretary Geithner's current administration of the
Treasury Department.82
IV. SIG TARP's SECOND YEAR: AGGRESSIVE CRITICISM OF
TREASURY IN THREE AREAS
When TARP officially expired in October 2010, the
Department of Treasury estimated the final cost of its programs to
83
taxpayers at $51 billion. Treasury's arithmetic included a $17
billion gain from TARP Bank and Credit Market Programs, offset
by losses in the HAMP (estimated at $46 billion), Auto Programs
(estimated at $17 billion), and AIG (estimated at $5 billion).8M
Treasury later reassessed the AIG figure, saying that the
government may ultimately profit from its current ownership stake
in the company." Barofsky questioned the validity of Treasury's
figures, saying that Treasury was "manipulating numbers for a big
PR push."86 In 2010, SIG TARP and Treasury disagreed in
assessments of three major TARP areas: the HAMP; GM
programming; and the AIG loss estimate.87
82. See SIG TARP HAMP AUDIT REPORT, supra note 10, at 31-34 (criticizing
Treasury's implementation of the HAMP); SIG TARP AUTO AUDIT REPORT, supra
note 51, at 28-32 (criticizing the manner by which auto-dealerships were shuttered
under Treasury supervision); SIG TARP QUARTERLY REPORT, Oct. 2010, supra note
4, at 9 (stating, of AIG loss estimates, "Treasury's unfortunate insensitivity to the
values of transparency has led it to engage in conduct that risks further damaging
public trust in Government").
83. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF FIN. STABILITY, TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM: TWO YEAR RETROSPECTIVE 4 (Oct. 2010), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/briefing-
room/reports/agency-reports/Documents/TARP%2Two%20Year%20Retrospectiv
e_10%2005%2010transmittal%201etter.pdf [hereinafter TREASURY TARP Two
YEAR RETROSPECTIVE].
84. Id.
85. Brady Dennis, AIG files plan to pay off debt to NY Fed, WASH. POST, Dec. 9,
2010, at A18, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/12/08/AR2010120807407.html (including a statement from
Tim Massad, acting Treasury Assistant Sec'y for Fin. Stability: "we believe taxpayers
will recover every dollar invested in AIG and stand a good chance of making a
profit").
86. Schmidt, Bailout Cop Trains Fire, supra note 10 (quoting Barofsky directly,
and also describing the "animus" that has developed between SIG TARP and the
White House).
87. See infra Part IV.A-C.
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A. The Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP)
The HAMP was announced by Treasury in February 2009
as a program to subsidize the restructuring of privately-owned
mortgage loans with the goal of helping citizens avoid
foreclosure.& The program functions by providing incentives for
modification to home-loan servicers on properties in default or at
serious risk of default - it helps fund the modifications, then
awards incentive payments to servicers upon successful
modifications.89 There is no mechanism for repayment; it is a
government subsidy."
The HAMP set out to modify between 3 million and 4
million mortgages through 2012." Through late 2010, there were
only 519,648 permanent modifications in place.? Meanwhile, in
that same time period, 541,907 trial modifications were cancelled.93
Thus, there was a forty-nine percent rate of success for a HAMP
modification during this time period.94 Through 2010, the HAMP
has been much criticized.95 Treasury defended the program in
October 2010, asserting that HAMP "has used taxpayer resources
efficiently."" SIG TARP disagreed with this assessment.
88. SIG TARP HAMP AUDIT REPORT, supra note 10, at 1.
89. Id. at 2.
90. CONGR. BUDGET OFFICE, REPORT ON THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
PROGRAM-NOV. 2010 7 (Nov. 2010), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/119xx/docll980/11-29-TARP.pdf [hereinafter CBO
TARP REPORT, Nov. 2010].
91. Jim Puzzanghera, Mortgage Aid Program Struggling, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21,
2010, at Bi, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/aug/21/business/la-fi-obama-
foreclosures-20100821.
92. COP DEC.2010 REPORT, supra note 33, at 18.
93. Id. at 29.
94. 519,648 permanent modifications, divided by 1,061,555 total attempted
modifications, equals a 48.9% "success rate."
95. See generally Stephanie Armour, Trials drag on for loan help; Many 3-month
plans are hitting 6 months, USA TODAY, Aug. 23, 2010, at 3B, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/money/20100823/mortgages23-st.art.htm
(detailing the problems in HAMP's execution); Nick Timiraos, HAMP Slips, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 11, 2010, at C8 (briefing the percentages of delinquent payments in
current HAMP trial modifications); Kathleen Lynn, Homeowners frustrated by delays
in federal loan program, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2010, at E3, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/08/05/AR2010080507425.html (describing delays in decisions
on HAMP applications by struggling homeowners).
96. TREASURY TARP Two YEAR RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 83, at 72.
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SIG TARP found that Treasury's goals for HAMP were
unclear.97 Though the plan had initially sought to "help 3 to 4
million homeowners avoid foreclosure," later statements by
Treasury suggested that 3 to 4 million homeowners would receive
offers for trial modification." Given the poor success rate for
conversion of three-month trial modifications into permanent loan
modifications, Treasury had no set number by which to measure
performance.99  SIG TARP also criticized Treasury's
implementation of the HAMP, citing: repeated changes to
program terms, causing confusion and delay; insufficient efforts to
market the program to the public; and a high re-default rate which
threatened the long-term success of the program.'" SIG TARP
characterized the HAMP as "spending tens of billions of dollars of
taxpayer funds on a program that is assumed . .. to fail ultimately
for 40 percent of the participants . . . .'o
Given that most banks have paid back their TARP
obligations, Treasury's HAMP operation is one of the few
remaining TARP programs in which taxpayers' money might be
used inefficiently.'02 Barofsky's October 2010 public statement
that HAMP "has had incredibly anemic effect so far,"'03 exists in
stark contrast to Treasury's October claim that the program, "has
transformed the way the entire mortgage servicing system
operates. "' In September 2010, Barofsky responded to Treasury
comments that HAMP was successful because of its attempts to
help homeowners, despite the high failure rate of these trial
modifications, saying, "a failed trial modification is a failure; there
is no success . . . I don't see how you can define success through a
failure, which is what [Treasury's] attempt here is."'o
97. See SIG TARP HAMP AUDIT REPORT, supra note 10, at 30.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 31-33.
101. Id. at 33.
102. See TREASURY TARP Two YEAR RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 83, at 4.
103. Interview by Neil Cavuto with Neil Barofsky, Special Inspector Gen. for the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (Oct. 4,2010).
104. TREASURY TARP Two YEAR RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 83, at 72.
105. Interview by Thomson Reuters Media with Neil Barofsky, Special Inspector
Gen. for the Troubled Asset Relief Program in Wash. D.C. (Sept. 21, 2010).
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According to Treasury's October 2010 estimate, the HAMP
will account for $46 billion in TARP losses to taxpayers.'0 In
contrast to Treasury figures, the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) has estimated a significantly lower cost for the HAMP
subsidy. In November 2010, the CBO estimated that $12 billion in
total TARP funds would ultimately be expended on HAMP.10o
The COP weighed in on the matter, citing the CBO estimate in
arguing that, due to HAMP's failings, much of the $45.6 billion
allocated for foreclosure prevention will go unused.1" In short, in
2010, reports from SIG TARP, the CBO, and the COP suggested
that the HAMP was floundering.
Secretary Geithner, aware of these criticisms, has pledged
to revise cost estimates for the HAMP subsidy.c'" Though he
believes that the $12 billion CBO figure is "too pessimistic" he has
committed to a comprehensive assessment of what Treasury is
likely to spend on mortgage-relief programming under the
TARP.no In this way, by questioning Treasury's optimistic
October 2010 assessment for HAMP disbursements, oversight
authorities are bringing clarity to Treasury's TARP
implementation and reporting.
B. Treasury's GM Plan
In October 2010, Treasury estimated a $17 billion loss from
its auto programs."' In supporting the forecast, Treasury cited two
positive quarters of net income for GM and Chrysler and four
positive quarters for auto-financing company Ally Financial.112
Before the November 2010 Initial Public Offering (IPO) of the
government's common shares, GM owed the government $40
106. TREASURY TARP Two YEAR RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 83, at 4.
107. CBO TARP REPORT, Nov. 2010, supra note 90, at 7.
108. See COP DEC. 2010 REPORT, supra note 33, at 107.
109. See COP Hearing with Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner (Video
Recording), COP.SENATE.GOV (Dec. 16, 2010),
http://cop.senate.gov/hearings/library/hearing-121610-geithner.cfm, at 97:00
[hereinafter COP Hearing Video].
110. Id.
111. TREASURY TARP Two YEAR RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 83, at 4.
112. Id. at 48.
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billion in TARP funds,"' which translated into a sixty-one percent
ownership stake in the auto manufacturer." 4
Upon Senator Grassley's request, SIG TARP analyzed the
current debt of GM and what stock price, per share, would repay
TARP loans."' In August 2010, Barofsky settled on a figure of
$133.78 per share.116 This figure did not include the government's
preferred shares or legal and investment banking fees for the
IPO.n7 Barofsky's figure also did not take in account any potential
stock split."8  Such a split occurred before the IPO, with GM
splitting by a factor of 3-to-i." 9 As a result, the break-even point
for the U.S. Treasury to recoup losses from sale of stock is around
$44 per share.120
The November 18, 2010 IPO allowed the Treasury to
reduce its stake in GM to around thirty-seven percent or slightly
lower by some estimates,'121 as the company sold 478 million of 912
122
million total shares at an average price of $33 per share. In order
to break even, the company will need to sell its remaining shares at
an average price of $52.80 per share. 23 President Obama
welcomed the return of GM stock to active trading as "another big
113. Editorial, GM: Car-buncle on the Body Politic, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Sept.
23, 2010, at A10.
114. Peter Whoriskey, GM Shares must sell at $134 for US to break even, WASH.
POST, Sept. 23, 2010, at A20, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/09/22/AR2010092206067.html.
115. Letter from Neil M. Barofsky, Special Inspector Gen. for the Troubled Asset
Relief Program, to Sen. Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Member, U.S. Senate Comm.
on Fin. (Aug. 30, 2010).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. SIG TARP QUARTERLY REPORT, Ocr. 2010, supra note 4, at 147.
119. See Craig Trudell & David Welch, GM IPO Aims to Make US Minority




121. Marilyn Alva, GM Rises In Debut After Massive IP0 But Ends Near Lows,
INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Nov. 19, 2010, at Al (figuring a decrease in government
ownership to 33% of GM stock, or lower at 26% if warrants and overallotments are
used).
122. Mark Guarino, Feds begin pull back from managing General Motors
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step toward becoming a success story."124 Not surprisingly, Neil
Barofsky's SIG TARP office offered a more cautious assessment
of GM's prospects.
Noting mismanagement in the Treasury's TARP Auto
Program, SIG TARP has highlighted issues which may prove
problematic for GM."' In early 2009, GM came to the "Auto
Team" of the Department of the Treasury - two advisors with
private equity background, together with fifteen staff, charged
with determining the viability of GM and Chrysler 26 - with a plan
to close 1,650 dealerships by 2014.127 Treasury's Auto Team
rejected this plan, and GM resubmitted a more accelerated
schedule that would close 1,454 dealerships by October 2010.128
SIG TARP found that this forced acceleration by the Auto Team
was a mistake for at least two reasons.2 9 First, accelerated
dealership terminations were not based on GM's cost savings
estimates, so the interest of the long-term viability of the company
was not served.o Secondly, the Auto Team's actions resulted in
thousands of jobs lost, perhaps unnecessarily.13'
As GM reorganizes, SIG TARP auditors have argued the
negative effect of Treasury decisions on the long-term viability of
the corporation. This argument is not without rejoinder - that
Treasury's decision to close dealerships, while perhaps
unfortunate, was reasonable given GM's difficult financial
position. In any case, Barofsky's analysis of TARP auto
124. Laura Meckler, Obama Claims Vindication on GM, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Nov.
18, 2010, 5:35 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/11/18/obama-claims-
vindication-on-gm.
125. See SIG TARP AUTO AUDIT REPORT, supra note 51, at 2.
126. Id.
127. 156 CONG. REC. H5813 (daily ed. July 20, 2010), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2010-07-20/pdflCREC-2010-07-20-ptl-
PgH5810.pdf (statement of Rep. Gohmert, quoting Neil Barofsky, Special Inspector
Gen. for the Troubled Asset Relief Program).
128. Id.
129. SIG TARP AUTO AUDITREPORT, supra note 51, at Summary.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Treasury's Back-Seat Driver, supra note 13, at A20 (further commenting on
SIG TARP's speculation on lost jobs, "The alternative was zero jobs for everyone. .
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programming demonstrated SIG TARP's knack for rigorous
oversight through its Treasury audits.
C. Treasury's AIG Loss Estimate
In October 2010, Treasury estimated an ultimate $5 billion
loss in its AIG holdings from the TARP.' SIG TARP soon
responded, harshly criticizing Treasury for allegedly adopting
inconsistent methodology.1" The disagreement resulted in a series
of acrimonious public statements between Administration and SIG
TARP officials. One columnist remarked that SIG TARP was "in
135
open warfare" with the Administration. Ultimately, the
occurrence showed the benefit of independent oversight.
Treasury's November 2010 AIG loss estimates incorporated the
136clarity and explanation that SIG TARP requested.
In September 2010, AIG announced a recapitalization plan
which created the possibility of an accelerated government exit
from AIG ownership through a prospective IPO of the
government's shares.' With the recapitalization plan in mind,
Treasury projected the overall estimated government cost of AIG
aid under TARP at $5 billion.' SIG TARP cried foul. Barofsky's
office maintained that Treasury failed to take volatility in stock-
prices into account in its projection.'3 ' Furthermore, SIG TARP
contended that Treasury adopted different methodology "as part
133. TREASURY TARP Two YEAR RETROSPECrIVE, supra note 83, at 4.
134. See SIG TARP QUARTERLY REPORT, Ocr. 2010, supra note 4, at 7-10
135. Schmidt, Neil Barofsky, supra note 6.
136. See Mary Williams Walsh, A Footnote Explains a Dispute over Treasury's
Bailout Figures, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2010, at B4, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/17/business/17aig.html ("In its new annual report,
the Treasury provided what appears to be the footnote that Mr. Barofsky was
looking for."); U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF FIN. STABILITY, AGENCY
FIN. REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2010 11, tbl.6, n.3 (Nov. 2010), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/briefing-
room/reports/agency-reports/Documents/2010%200FS %20AFR%2ONov%2015.pdf
[hereinafter TREASURY OFS FIN. REPORT, 2010].
137. See SIG TARP QUARTERLY REPORT, OCT. 2010, supra note 4, at 7.
138. TREASURY TARP Two YEAR RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 83, at 4.
139. SIG TARP QUARTERLY REPORT, Ocr. 2010, supra note 4, at 7.
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of a multifaceted publicity campaign touting the positive aspects of
TARP... ."140
The Administration responded with vigor. White House
Deputy Communications Director Jen Psaki quipped, "some
people don't like movies with happy endings," and accused SIG
TARP of trying to grab a few cheap headlines.141 In a more official
response, Timothy Massad, Acting Assistant Secretary of
Treasury's Office of Financial Stability, insisted that the loss
estimate was consistent with the Department's published
methodology standards.142 Massad argued that the table
calculating the AIG loss estimate was qualified, in bold print, as
"post-Restructuring. 143 Barofsky was not satisfied; he wanted a
footnote whenever the AIG figure was used - for example, in the
Executive Summary - explaining that the estimate assumed
positive values on transactions yet to occur.*
Ultimately, Barofsky received his footnote. In November
2010, Treasury published its yearly, audited, financial report on the
TARP.145 When the AIG $5.1 billion loss estimate was listed, a
healthy footnote included, among other things, that "market prices
will change" and that "the restructuring is subject to contingencies
and has not been completed."' 4 Though the result was only a few
words of clarification, SIG TARP seemed to achieve its goal -
transparency in presentation of Treasury figures. 147
140. Id. at 8.
141. Psaki, supra note 13. Barofsky responded to Psaki's comments, calling them
"staggeringly inappropriate." Schmidt, Neil Barofsky, supra note 6.
142. Memorandum by Timothy Massad, Acting Assistant Sec'y, Office of Fin.
Stability, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, RE: AIG Loss Estimate, Oct. 29, 2010.
143. See id. at 1; TREASURY TARP Two YEAR RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 83, at
52.
(containing the chart to which Mr. Massad refers).
144. See Walsh, supra note 136, at B4 (characterizing the clarification that
Barofsky sought).
145. TREASURY OFS FIN. REPORT, 2010, supra note 136.
146. Id. at 11, tbl.6, n.3.
147. See Walsh, supra note 136, at B4.
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V. CONCLUSION
The SIG TARP office has a hotline, which anyone can call
to report an incident of TARP fraud.'" Neil Barofsky explained
that, when SIG TARP began, calls to the hotline were routed to
his office telephone; "I would just pick it up."149 This type of
hands-on approach seems appropriate for the watchdog of our
history's largest emergency transfer of public funds to the private
sector. Even Secretary Geithner, the object of seemingly constant
criticism from SIG TARP, reflected, "one of the great strengths of
our country is that we subject the judgments of public officials to
very difficult, rigorous, independent oversight."5 o
In 2009, Barofsky's growing SIG TARP operation fought
to maintain this independence. In 2010, SIG TARP offered
criticism of Treasury's TARP measures in three areas: the HAMP;
Auto Programs; and the AIG loss estimate. In response, Treasury
has made important alterations in its TARP implementation and
reporting. To borrow Secretary Geithner's words, Neil Barofsky's
oversight as SIG TARP has been difficult, rigorous, and
independent."'
SAMUEL R. DIAMANT
148. See Following the Money (J. Econ. Comm.), supra note 47, at 19-20
(statement of Neil Barofsky, Special Inspector Gen. for the Troubled Asset Relief
Program).
149. See id.
150. COP Hearing Video, supra note 109, at 52:00.
151. Id.
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